Many facilities are configured with interior rooms, closets, passageways, and the like, that were not designed to serve as an impediment to reasonably dedicated forced entry. While there are instances where it is desirable to expediently secure areas not usually intended for shelter, hardware and infrastructure configurations may render attempts difficult or impossible.
At one extreme, passage function locksets are installed in certain areas of such facilities. A passage locket may be defined as a cylindrical or mortise locksets wherein neither the interior, nor exterior, knob or lever is capable of being locked against rotation (nor otherwise mechanically disengaged from the latch as is possible with lost-motion, or free-wheeling, type of vandal resistant door hardware). Passage lockets, while readily available in robust and heavy-duty Grade 1 cylindrical or mortise configurations, are often installed in locations that building designers deem security or privacy to be superfluous. Passage locksets are generally less expensive, but avoidance of nuisance locking events may also influence one's decision to use passages sets. Passage sets may be found on closet doors, doors leading from upper floors to stairwells, doors located in a cluster beyond a common locked entryway, and the like.
In areas where the prevention of unintentional entry by a well-intentioned individual is important, a privacy function lockset may be used. A privacy function lockset may be defined as a lockset wherein the exterior knob or lever may be locked against rotation by way of a thumb turn, pushbutton, or similar non-keyed action by a user standing on the interior side. In most instances, the exterior privacy knob or lever does not employ a keyed cylinder as a means for unlocking the lockset (say, in the event that a patient become incapacitated while in a bathroom). Rather, a manufacturer provided tool (e.g., a polygonal rod, an implement analogous to a small blade screwdriver, etc.), or a feature capable of being interfaced with a household item (e.g. a slot that may be twisted with a coin), may be used to unlock the door. As such, only someone who desires to honor the wishes of the occupant's privacy is prevented from opening the door. “Defeat” of the privacy function lock is trivial for an individual who wishes to enter the locked door.
Facilities may also employ keyed lockets in multiple configurations. However, even though keyed, the function or construction of the lockset may not contemplate delaying a determined forced entry attempt. For example, the lockset on a CEO's door may be keyed differently from other employee's doors, but may be no more resistant to forced entry (by kicking, wedging, prying, etc.) than the privacy function locksets used in the same facility. Additionally, most locksets are not designed with a feature that will repel a nefarious possessor of the correct key. For example, the CEO may leave his keys on a secretary's desk, while simultaneously desiring to lock himself in his office during a workplace violence event. Similarly, in some buildings, electronic key card access causes many doors to be “locked” to general access, but may be unlocked with an electronic key card possessed by employees or staff.
As a result of these limitations, a number of ingress denial, or ingress delay, apparatus and methods have been devised to combat the perceived threat of active shooters, workplace violence, or other forced entry into an occupied room. Barricading during these events with furniture, desks, bookshelves, etc. is recommended (for example, by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) but takes time, effort, and may not be possible or effective. For example, an individual of slight build, or a child, may be unable to position massive furniture components for use as a barricade. Additionally, an outswinging door is less conducive to barricading with furniture, since the door swings free of the impeding furniture mass.
Likewise, replacement locksets having dedicated lockout features do exist, but upgrading facility locks is often cost prohibitive. For example, to replace a single classroom function lockset with an “intruder function” lockset may cost $500 to $700 in the case of a grade 1 mortise lockset.
Similarly, auxiliary devices exist that are configured to bolster the security of existing door and lockset combinations, however, most are not designed for rapid deployment under the stress of a life threatening encounter. For example, devices marketed to augment hotel locks and disable entry by a maid or emergency key, require a multi-step locking process, and may be multi-part assemblies. Additionally, many have infirmities from a user interface perspective (they are cumbersome to use and the user's fingers/hands/arms can get in the way of the door shutting). Further still, many products are not strong enough to stop a serious effort by a strong intruder to breach the door. Lastly, of the commercially available products that address some of those issues, their robustness may impair removal and egress in the event of an emergency or intervening circumstances.
As a result, there exists a need in the art for a portable, rapidly deployable, emergency door barricade that is sufficiently resistant to forced entry and is designed to facilitate efficient removal thereof.